文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：基于微分博弈的无线传感器网络恶意程序传播模型

英文题名：Propagation Model of Malware in Wireless Sensor Networks Based on Differential Games

作者：周海平[1];沈士根[1];冯晟[1];黄龙军[1];彭华[1]

机构：[1]绍兴文理学院计算机科学与工程系

年份：2019

卷号：32

期号：6

起止页码：931

中文期刊名：传感技术学报

外文期刊名：Chinese Journal of Sensors and Actuators

收录：CSTPCD、、北大核心2017、Scopus、CSCD2019_2020、北大核心、CSCD

基金：国家自然科学基金项目(61772018)

语种：中文

中文关键词：无线传感器网络;恶意程序传播;微分博弈;元胞自动机

外文关键词：wireless sensor networks;malware propagation;differential game;cellular automata

中文摘要：恶意程序传播是无线传感器网络WSNs(Wireless Sensor Networks)面临的一项重要安全问题,传统的研究大多从入侵检测方法的角度阻止恶意程序的传播,很少考虑攻防博弈策略对恶意程序传播过程的影响。从博弈论的角度对攻防双方的博弈策略进行分析,建立了WSNs的攻防博弈模型及恶意程序传播模型,并将博弈均衡策略与传播模型耦合起来,得到了博弈参数与传播模型的稳态感染比例之间的关系。研究结果显示:当合法节点被感染恶意程序时的损失大于其检测到恶意程序时的收益时,能有效抑制WSNs中恶意程序的传播。此外,通信半径的增加、节点的移动行为能加速恶意程序的传播。研究结果对抑制WSNs中的恶意程序传播具有理论指导作用。

外文摘要：Malware propagation in Wireless Sensor Networks(WSNs)is an important security problem. Traditional researches for preventing the propagation of malware are often made by developing intrusion detection methods,but are seldom made by developing attack-defense game strategies. We analyzed the attack-defense strategies between malicious nodes and normal nodes,established an attack-defense game model and a malware propagation model of WSNs. By coupling the game equilibrium strategy with the propagation model,we obtain the relations between the game parameters and the steady-state infection ratio. The results show that when the loss of the legitimate nodes for being infected is greater than its revenue for detecting malicious programs,the spreading process of malware will be effectively inhibited. In addition,the increase of communication radius and the moving of nodes can accelerate the propagation of malware. The results of this paper are of significance for people to formulate measures to curb the propagation of malware.