文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Trust Dynamics in WSNs: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach

作者：Shen, Shigen[1,2];Huang, Longjun[1,3];Fan, En[1];Hu, Keli[1];Liu, Jianhua[2];Cao, Qiying[4]

机构：[1]Shaoxing Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Shaoxing 312000, Peoples R China;[2]Jiaxing Univ, Coll Math Phys & Informat Engn, Jiaxing 314001, Peoples R China;[3]Zhejiang Univ Technol, Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Hangzhou 310014, Zhejiang, Peoples R China;[4]Donghua Univ, Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China

年份：2016

卷号：2016

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF SENSORS

收录：SCI-EXPANDED(收录号：WOS:000375268800001)、、EI(收录号：20162202437458)、Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-84969872630)、WOS

基金：This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants nos. 61272034 and 61572014 and by Science Foundation of Shaoxing University under Grant no. 20145021.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Decision theory - Dynamics - Network security - Sensor nodes

外文摘要：A sensor node (SN) in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) can decide whether to collaborate with others based on a trust management system (TMS) by making a trust decision. In this paper, we study the trust decision and its dynamics that play a key role to stabilize the whole network using evolutionary game theory. When SNs are making their decisions to select action Trust or Mistrust, a WSNs trust game is created to reflect their utilities. An incentive mechanism bound with one SN's trust degree is incorporated into this trust game and effectively promotes SNs to select action Trust. The replicator dynamics of SNs' trust evolution, illustrating the evolutionary process of SNs selecting their actions, are given. We then propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies can be attained under different parameter values, which supply theoretical foundations to devise a TMS for WSNs. Moreover, we can find out the conditions that will lead SNs to choose action Trust as their final behavior. In this manner, we can assure WSNs' security and stability by introducing a trust mechanism to satisfy these conditions. Experimental results have confirmed the proposed theorems and the effects of the incentive mechanism.