文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Trade Credit and Buyer Financing

作者：Zhou, Weihua[1];Hu, Yulin[1];Lin, Tiantian[1,2];Ding, Zhigang[3]

机构：[1]Zhejiang Univ, Sch Management, Hangzhou 310058, Peoples R China;[2]Cardinal Operat, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China;[3]Shaoxing Univ, Business Sch, Shaoxing 312000, Peoples R China

年份：2022

卷号：31

期号：3

起止页码：288

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING

收录：SCI-EXPANDED(收录号：WOS:000809664000002)、、EI(收录号：20222412228123)、Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85131786064)、WOS

基金：This research is supported by National Key R&D Program of China under Grant No. 2019YFB1404901, the Key R&D Program of Zhejiang Province under Grant No. 2021C01104 and National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 72192823 and 71821002. The authors sincerely thank the editors and anonymous referees for their constructive comments to significantly improve the paper.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Supply chain finance; supply chain risk allocation; payment term; game theory

外文摘要：This study investigates trade credit and early payment financing in a three-party supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a capital-constrained distributor, and a retail platform. The manufacturer or the platform provides the financing service to the distributor. Two different leadership structures are investigated, namely, platform and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game, where the platform or manufacturer first makes the decision, respectively. Under trade credit financing, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain face loss when the commission rate increases. However, under buyer financing, they benefit from the high commission rate. Under platform leadership, the distributor, the manufacturer, and the supply chain perform better with trade credit if and only if the commission rate is small or the production cost is high, while the platform always prefers buyer financing. Under manufacturer leadership, the distributor, manufacturer, and supply chain perform better with trade credit under low production cost and commission rate. The platform prefers trade credit when production cost is in the intermediate range. By further analyzing the case that both financing channels are available and the distributor decides which one to choose, we find that the financing services competition hurts only the platform's profits. And under certain conditions, trade credit and early payment can achieve the same performance for every supply chain member. These findings enhance our understanding of the supply chain risk allocation efficiency of trade credit and early payment financing under different leadership structures. Neither risk allocation form outperforms the other, and the relative efficiency depends on supply chain characteristics.