文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Stimulating trust cooperation in edge services: An evolutionary tripartite game

作者：Sun, Panjun[1];Shen, Shigen[2];Wu, Zongda[1];Zhou, Haiping[1];Gao, Xiao-Zhi[3]

机构：[1]Shaoxing Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Shaoxing 312000, Peoples R China;[2]Huzhou Univ, Sch Informat Engn, Huzhou 313000, Peoples R China;[3]Univ Eastern Finland, Sch Comp, Kuopio 70211, Finland

年份：2022

卷号：116

外文期刊名：ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

收录：SCI-EXPANDED(收录号：WOS:000869760100010)、、EI(收录号：20224212899923)、Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-85139591622)、WOS

基金：This paper was supported in part by Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant LZ22F020002, Humanities and Social Sciences Planning Foundation of Ministry of Education of China under Grant 22YJAZH090, and the key project of Humanities and Social Sciences in Colleges and Universities of Zhejiang Province under Grant 2021GH017.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Edge service; Tripartite game; Dynamics replication equation; Jacobian matrix; Convergence stability

外文摘要：Network edge services have contributed to ordinary people's daily lives with numerous conveniences but the accompanying problems, such as counterfeiting, the trust crisis and the service provider' s lack of standardization, have created some turmoil in the industry. Trust is crucial to network services, and the responsibilities of a platform's trust supervision can no longer be ignored. To enhance trust and cooperation among service participants, this paper constructs a new tripartite game model of monitors, edge service providers (ESPs) and users. First, this paper discusses the characteristics of the players in the edge service game and establishes a tripartite payment matrix model. Second, this paper outlines the concept of an evolutionary stability strategy, analyzes how to apply the dynamic replication equation to calculate the equilibrium solution and obtains the phase diagrams of the monitor, ESP, and the user. The ideal stable state point {active monitoring, honesty, trust} is obtained by calculating the value of an eigenvalue less than zero in the Jacobian matrix. Finally, this paper designs relevant experimental studies to verify and compare the correctness and effectiveness of several factors that affect the convergence stability of the evolutionary games, compares them with other research models, considers some advantages and discusses future development directions.