文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：消费替代、政府监管与食品质量安全风险分析

英文题名：The Analysis of Consumer Alternative,Government Regulation and Food Quality Safety Risk

作者：晚春东[1];秦志兵[1];丁志刚[1]

机构：[1]绍兴文理学院经济与管理学院

年份：2017

卷号：0

期号：1

起止页码：59

中文期刊名：中国软科学

外文期刊名：China Soft Science

收录：CSTPCD、、北大核心2014、CSSCI2017_2018、CSCD2017_2018、北大核心、CSSCI、CSCD

基金：国家自然科学基金项目"食品供应链质量安全风险演变机理与调控优化模型"(71372175);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(16YJC630019)

语种：中文

中文关键词：消费替代;政府监管;食品生产商;演化博弈模型;食品质量安全风险

外文关键词：consumer alternative; government regulation; food producer; evolutionary game model; food quality safety risk

中文摘要：为探究如何调控供应链环境下的食品质量安全风险,引入消费替代参数λ,构建了食品生产商和消费者之间的动态博弈模型,并进行了算例仿真检验分析。研究结果表明:当食品的消费替代水平较低时,只有政府食品监管者的主动监管概率处于一个很高的水平,食品生产商才会偏好于选择生产优质安全食品策略;而当消费替代水平较高时,食品监管者既可以通过保持适当的主动监管概率和消费者举报响应度,也可以通过保持一定的主动监管概率来激励食品厂商选择生产优质安全食品。最后,结合理论分析提出了促使广大食品厂商生产优质安全食品的相关建议。

外文摘要：In order to explore how to control the risk of food quality safety under the environment of the supply chain,a dynamic game model between food producers and consumers was constructed by introducing the consumption substitution parameter called λ,and the example simulation test analysis was carried on. The results show that when the alternative food consumption level is low,only if the regulators of the active regulatory probability is at a high level,will food producers prefer to choose the strategy of producing quality and safety food; When the alternative food consumption level is higher,regulators can not only by maintaining proper active supervision probability and consumer complaint response lever,can also through maintaining active supervision probability in a high lever to encourage food manufacturers to choose to produce quality and safety food. Finally,combined with theoretical analysis,some suggestions which can promote the vast number of food manufacturers to produce quality and safety food was put forward.