文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：重点任务驱动、财政增收激励与集体经营性建设用地入市改革

英文题名：Priority Tasks Driven,Fiscal Revenue Growth and China’s Rural Construction Land Marketization

作者：胡如梅[1];胡鸿伟[1];周天肖[2]

机构：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058;[2]绍兴文理学院商学院,浙江绍兴312000

年份：2023

卷号：37

期号：10

起止页码：40

中文期刊名：中国土地科学

外文期刊名：China Land Science

收录：CSTPCD、、国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库、CSCD2023_2024、北大核心、CSCD、北大核心2020

基金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“自然资源资产产权制度改革重大问题研究”(20JZD013);百山祖国家公园科学研究项目(2021ZDZX02);浙江省软科学一般项目“促进浙江省农民增收的机制保障与政策优化研究”(2021C35066)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：集体经营性建设用地入市;地方政府;改革回应;重点任务;财政增收

外文关键词：rural construction land marketization reform;local government;reform response;priority task;fiscal revenue growth

中文摘要：研究目的:从地方政府行为视角,探究农村集体经营性建设用地入市改革中地方差异的影响因素和作用机制,为构建城乡统一建设用地市场提供政策启示。研究方法:案例比较分析。研究结果:受重点任务驱动,首批试点地方分配更多注意力在“农地入市”,改革进展明显优于非首批试点;首批试点地方中,中西部城市的入市改革表现总体上并不逊色于东部经济发达城市,前者依赖政府主导的“以地谋发展”模式的效果明显不如后者。地方财政增收对政府保持供地垄断地位的依赖程度较低的地方开展和推进入市改革的动力相对较强,而高层级政府的关注会强化这一动力。研究结论:地方政府的代理人属性和财政增收的自利属性共同影响其政策创新与执行。入市改革进展是地方政府代理人属性和财政增收激励综合作用的结果,地方政府的回应差异源于该项改革对地方财政收益格局的影响差异以及高层级政府的重视程度差异。建议优化中央与地方间的事权和财权划分,利用政治权威的显著影响促使地方突破对传统的“以地谋发展”模式的路径依赖,抓紧研究集体土地流转过程中相关税费的收取方案,保障政府在土地增值过程中合理的收益分享权。

外文摘要：The purpose of this paper is to explore the influencing factors and mechanisms of local differences in the reform of China’s rural construction land market,to provide the references for the unified urban-rural construction land market construction.The research method is comparative analysis of cases.The results show that 1)driven by priority tasks,the proportion of collective construction land supplied by the first round of pilot areas on the primary market is significantly higher than that of non-first round of pilot areas.2)In the first round of pilot areas,the central and western areas performed generally as well as their economically developed counterparts in the eastern regions.The former’s reliance on the government’s monopoly position in the primary land market to promote fiscal revenue and economic development is noticeably less effective than the latter.It indicates that the local government less depending on a monopoly on land supply for increasing fiscal revenue tend to have a stronger motivation to initiate and promote market-oriented reforms.And the attention from higher-level governments further reinforces this motivation.It concludes that the progress of rural land marketization reform is influenced by the agent characteristics of the local government and the fiscal revenue incentive.The disparity in responses of the local governments arises from the differences in the impact of this reform on local fiscal revenue and variations in the level of attention from higher-level governments.It is suggested that the division of administrative and financial powers between the central and local governments should be optimized,particularly,deploying the significant influence of political authority to promote the local breakthroughs from the path dependence,and promptly crafting the collection schemes for taxes and fees related to collective land transfer,and ensuring the reasonable incremental land revenue sharing rights of the government.